An Evasion Attack against ML-based Phishing URL Detectors

Background: Over the year, Machine Learning Phishing URL classification (MLPU) systems have gained tremendous popularity to detect phishing URLs proactively. Despite this vogue, the security vulnerabilities of MLPUs remain mostly unknown. Aim: To address this concern, we conduct a study to understand the test time security vulnerabilities of the state-of-the-art MLPU systems, aiming at providing guidelines for the future development of these systems. Method: In this paper, we propose an evasion attack framework against MLPU systems. To achieve this, we first develop an algorithm to generate adversarial phishing URLs. We then reproduce 41 MLPU systems and record their baseline performance. Finally, we simulate an evasion attack to evaluate these MLPU systems against our generated adversarial URLs. Results: In comparison to previous works, our attack is: (i) effective as it evades all the models with an average success rate of 66% and 85% for famous (such as Netflix, Google) and less popular phishing targets (e.g., Wish, JBHIFI, Officeworks) respectively; (ii) realistic as it requires only 23ms to produce a new adversarial URL variant that is available for registration with a median cost of only $11.99/year. We also found that popular online services such as Google SafeBrowsing and VirusTotal are unable to detect these URLs. (iii) We find that Adversarial training (successful defence against evasion attack) does not significantly improve the robustness of these systems as it decreases the success rate of our attack by only 6% on average for all the models. (iv) Further, we identify the security vulnerabilities of the considered MLPU systems. Our findings lead to promising directions for future research. Conclusion: Our study not only illustrate vulnerabilities in MLPU systems but also highlights implications for future study towards assessing and improving these systems.Comment: Draft for ACM TOP

Understanding the Heterogeneity of Contributors in Bug Bounty Programs

Background: While bug bounty programs are not new in software development, an increasing number of companies, as well as open source projects, rely on external parties to perform the security assessment of their software for reward. However, there is relatively little empirical knowledge about the characteristics of bug bounty program contributors. Aim: This paper aims to understand those contributors by highlighting the heterogeneity among them. Method: We analyzed the histories of 82 bug bounty programs and 2,504 distinct bug bounty contributors, and conducted a quantitative and qualitative survey. Results: We found that there are project-specific and non-specific contributors who have different motivations for contributing to the products and organizations. Conclusions: Our findings provide insights to make bug bounty programs better and for further studies of new software development roles.Comment: 6 pages, ESEM 201

The 2004 UTfit Collaboration Report on the Status of the Unitarity Triangle in the Standard Model

Using the latest determinations of several theoretical and experimental parameters, we update the Unitarity Triangle analysis in the Standard Model. The basic experimental constraints come from the measurements of |V_ub/V_cb|, Delta M_d, the lower limit on Delta M_s, epsilon_k, and the measurement of the phase of the B_d - anti B_d mixing amplitude through the time-dependent CP asymmetry in B^0 to J/psi K^0 decays. In addition, we consider the direct determination of alpha, gamma, 2 beta + gamma and cos(2 beta) from the measurements of new CP-violating quantities, recently performed at the B factories. We also discuss the opportunities offered by improving the precision of the various physical quantities entering in the determination of the Unitarity Triangle parameters. The results and the plots presented in this paper can also be found at http://www.utfit.org, where they are continuously updated with the newest experimental and theoretical results.Comment: 32 pages, 17 figures. High resolution figures and updates can be found at http://www.utfit.org v2: misprints correcte

Interpretability and Transparency-Driven Detection and Transformation of Textual Adversarial Examples (IT-DT)

Transformer-based text classifiers like BERT, Roberta, T5, and GPT-3 have shown impressive performance in NLP. However, their vulnerability to adversarial examples poses a security risk. Existing defense methods lack interpretability, making it hard to understand adversarial classifications and identify model vulnerabilities. To address this, we propose the Interpretability and Transparency-Driven Detection and Transformation (IT-DT) framework. It focuses on interpretability and transparency in detecting and transforming textual adversarial examples. IT-DT utilizes techniques like attention maps, integrated gradients, and model feedback for interpretability during detection. This helps identify salient features and perturbed words contributing to adversarial classifications. In the transformation phase, IT-DT uses pre-trained embeddings and model feedback to generate optimal replacements for perturbed words. By finding suitable substitutions, we aim to convert adversarial examples into non-adversarial counterparts that align with the model's intended behavior while preserving the text's meaning. Transparency is emphasized through human expert involvement. Experts review and provide feedback on detection and transformation results, enhancing decision-making, especially in complex scenarios. The framework generates insights and threat intelligence empowering analysts to identify vulnerabilities and improve model robustness. Comprehensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of IT-DT in detecting and transforming adversarial examples. The approach enhances interpretability, provides transparency, and enables accurate identification and successful transformation of adversarial inputs. By combining technical analysis and human expertise, IT-DT significantly improves the resilience and trustworthiness of transformer-based text classifiers against adversarial attacks